Discussion of Bradleys The Principles of Logic :: Bradley Principles Logic Essays

Discussion of Bradleys The Principles of logic If I make the claim, A wolf is a mammal, I do non assert eachthing about my idea of a wolf, but quite an something general about this realistic class of beasts. For Bradley, to admit this is to admit that ideas atomic number 18 general terms that refer to an independent reality. But notice that if, face with one of these actual canines, I then say Here is a wolf, each term of this singular thought is itself general and cannot mayhap hope to capture in its particularity and wealth of detail the fauna in question. If ideas ar always general, then how can they relate to the real that presents itself as a unique event with authoritative sensible glut? They could just as easily be describing all wolf and any here without an adequate fit or representation of sensory experience. These are Bradleys concerns in The Principles of Logic (PL)1, and since his proposed solutions to these problems were intended as a refutal of Humes empir icist psychology and Mills doctrine of inference, and since they shaped if not antedated many of Russells achievements in logical theory, they call for careful attention.2I mustiness note, however, that Bradley is particularly frustrating insofar as he eschews any sustained metaphysical investigations, claiming that metaphysics is a matter separate from his logical concerns. bonny at the point that one would demand a more determinate account, he remarks that to really consider such questions would involve him in metaphysics, which is not his present objective. However, as I hope to show, his entire theory of judgment rests on a clearly metaphysical consideration of the nature of clipping and space and, in fact, commits him to rather bizarre claims about the nature and contribution of singular judgments and indexicals. The notion that objects of experience are themselves symbolic will book Bradley to unite his metaphysic with his theory of intentionality and eventually fund tho se features of his account that are particularly relevant to our purposes viz., his anti-psychologism, from which naturally follows his attack on the impoverished apophantic paradigm in logic, his insistence on a distinction between logical and well-formed form, and his claim that all judgments, properly understood, are hypothetical judgments. I. ReferenceWe must first gain an appreciation for how pervasive the notion of reference is in Bradleys account. In this section I will first restrict the